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Abstract
We study policies that regulate executive compensation in a model that jointly deter-
mines executivese¤ort, compensation and rm leverage. The market failure that justi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regulation is that executives are optimistic about asset prices in states of distress. We
show that shareholders propose compensation packages that lead to socially excessive
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the structure of compensation (but not its level) with a cap on the ratio of variable-to-
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1 Introduction
Following the 2007-09 nancial crisis, there has been a lively debate in the academic and
policy circles about regulating executive compensation to avoid excessive rmsleverage. Some
countries have regulated the structure or the level of compensation, especially for nancial
rms, while others have adopted say-on-pay regimes that increase shareholders weight in the
design of executive compensation. For example, the European Union (Directive 2013/36/EU
and CRD4) has established that bonuses at credit institutions and investment rms cannot
exceed 100% of xed salary (200% if the company wins shareholder approval). The U.S. is
also discussing new rules to curb executive compensation in nancial institutions (Wall Street
Journal 2016). Correa and Lel (2016) document that eleven countries have passed laws to give
shareholders direct inuence on executive compensation policies (i.e., say on pay laws).
In this paper we analyze policies that regulate executive compensation in a model that is new
because it jointly determines leverage, compensation and executivese¤ort. This e¤ort a¤ects
the likelihood of a crisis. The model yields three main insights. First, we show that, when
the CEO is optimistic about asset prices in states of distress, shareholders prefer compensation
contracts that induce socially ine¢ cient rmsoverleverage. Second, regulating the ratio of
variable-to-xed payments (but not the level of compensation) can deliver socially optimal
leverage levels. However, our third result shows that it may be more e¢ cient (i.e., less distorting
in terms of e¤ort provision) to directly regulate leverage rather than executive compensation.
In our model, a representative price-taker rm is run by a risk-neutral CEO (she) who
decides the rms level of borrowing to nance an investment with stochastic payo¤s. The model
does not distinguish between nancial and non-nancial rms. There are many examples of
overborrowing for both nancial and non-nancial rms. For example, Ryou and Kim (2003)
describe overborrowing by Korean rms before the Asian nancial crisis of the late 1990s. More
recent examples include energy companies as Abengoas debt-fueled expansion (Wall Street
Journal 2015).
In the model, the CEO provides costly and unobservable e¤ort that determines the likelihood
of success of the investment. The rms shareholder (he) o¤ers the CEO a compensation
contract that includes, potentially, a xed salary and a variable, performance-based bonus.
Uncertainty is represented by two possible states. In the low(distressed) state of nature, the
rm must sell core assets at a discount (i.e., re sales) to cover debt losses. Following Gabaix
(2014), the CEO overborrows because she underestimates the marginal cost of re sales in the
event of distress. This is what we dene as managerial optimism.
The shareholder, even if he correctly estimates the marginal cost of re sales, prefers not
to amend the executives optimism and tolerates overborrowing because of two reasons. First,
higher leverage is motivating the CEO to put more e¤ort making the good state of nature
more likely; Second, the optimistic CEO, because she overestimates the rms prots, ends up
receiving a lower variable bonus than she expected. The shareholder benets from an e¤ort
level higher than what he is ultimately paying for.
In the model, like in Krugman (1998), re sales are not a mere wealth redistribution but
imply real costs for society because in states of distress the assets end up being ine¢ ciently
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managed.1 These "mismanagement externalities" caused by the re sales creates a role for
policy, even if the key friction is a behavioral one as optimism. The planner could achieve
Pareto superior outcomes if it could reduce the market equilibrium level of re sales. The
planner would choose the socially optimal level of rms borrowing as a tradeo¤ between the
real costs of re sales versus the gains from the investment nanced with debt.
We analyze two policy tools to induce social e¢ ciency. First, we restrict shareholderschoices
on the structure (although not the level) of executive compensation. That is, we impose a cap
on the variable relative to the xed salary. Second, we directly regulate the leverage level, like
with standard capital requirements or leverage restrictions. Finally, we compare the two policy
tools.
The model shows that regulating the ratio of variable bonus to xed salary may achieve the
socially optimal level of debt. This policy tool reduces the CEO incentives to provide e¤ort
(induced by the variable bonus). Thus, the probability of a crisis may be higher, but the losses
would be smaller due to smaller leverage.
Regulating compensation may not be the most e¢ cient policy to tackle overleverage. It may
be more e¢ cient to directly restrict leverage as proposed, for example, by Korinek and Jeanne
(2014). The intuition for this result is that restricting variable pay will likely distort e¤ort
incentives more than restricting leverage and letting the shareholder choose the compensation
contract. Thus, variable pay will be higher under a leverage restriction and so will be managerial
e¤ort.
Our paper contributes to several literatures. First, a growing literature has documented that
overcondence and optimism by rmsexecutives leads to overinvestment and overborrowing
(for example, Malmendier et al. 2005, Hackbarth 2009, Ben-David et al. 2013, Palmon and
Venezia 2013 and 2015, or Ho et al. 2016). However, this literature has not studied the
role of the endogenous CEOs e¤ort. We show two non-trivial channels that make the CEOs
e¤ort increasing in optimism. First, there is a complementarity between e¤ort and leverage.
Optimism encourages higher leverage, and higher leverage entices higher e¤ort to avoid the
larger losses if the low state on nature is realized. This complementarity between debt and
e¤ort is new in the literature. Second, as the manager is compensated in equity, the manager
has more incentives to put in e¤ort at a more valuable rm. Thus, more optimism means more
e¤ort.
Second, we complement Gervais et al. (2011) who show that shareholders strategically
benet from managers who overestimate their own skills by savingon compensation.2 In our
case, executives overestimation is related to asset prices that we model as in Gabaix (2014).
Another novelty of this paper is that CEOs e¤ort is endogenous and interacts with both the
choice of debt and the compensation contract proposed by the shareholder. These are key
extensions for the results and policies that we study.
Our results complement the recent literature which analyzes executive compensation as
1Krugman (1998) points to Michael Jacksons purchases of ski resorts during the 1997 Asian Financial crisis
and how he mismanaged them. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and Acharya et al. (2011) also examine re sales
to ine¢ cient investors.
2Otto (2014) and Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016) provide empirical support for this theory.
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a policy tool. For example, John et al. (2000), Bebchuk and Spamann (2009), Bolton et
al. (2015), Raviv and Sisli-Ciamarra (2013), Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), or Thanassoulis
(2014). This literature has mostly focused on risk-shifting problems and externalities from
competition in labor markets. Gete and Gómez (2015) compare compensation contracts in
a model with overborrowing externalities but exogenous e¤ort and exogenous compensation
contracts. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper to compare regulating compensation versus
leverage regulations.
Finally, most of our results apply to recent representative agent models of overborrowing
with collateral constraints in which the borrower does not internalize the link between her
actions and asset prices, like Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010),
or Stavrakeva (2013). In those papers the agent does not internalize the right re sale prices
because she is small and ignores general equilibrium e¤ects. In our model, the agent (the CEO)
is optimistic. In any case, the agent overborrows because she underestimates the cost of re
sales.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 shows
that shareholders propose compensation contracts that generate overleverage. Section 4 studies
regulations to achieve social e¢ ciency. Section 5 analyzes how our theoretical results may yield
di¤erent empirical predictions across sectors. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the
algebra.
2 Model
There is a continuum of small rms which we model as a representative price-taker rm.
The rm is composed of an executive (the CEO) and a shareholder. The shareholder owns the
rm but the CEO manages it. Both are risk-neutral. The shareholder only decides the CEOs
compensation contract. Besides the rm, there exists an unskilled investor. Next we discuss
the setup and the problem of each agent.
2.1 Setup
There is one period and we denote its beginning and end by t0 and t1. At the end of
the period there are two states of nature (high and low) that we denote with superscripts,
s = fh; lg:
There are two assets: a core asset and a new investment asset. The core asset represents the
steady-state strategyof the company. It involves relatively low uncertainty. Thus, we model
it as a risk-free asset that pays a deterministic gross return b > 0. At t0, the rm is endowed
with k units of the core asset. There exists as well a new investment asset that pays a gross
return ah if the state of nature is high, and al if it is low, with
al < R < ah: (1)
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At t0, the rms CEO can borrow d  0 units at an interest R to invest in the investment
asset. This investment asset represents a new, uncertain strategy. By putting some e¤ort
e > 0 the CEO a¤ects the likelihood of arriving to the high state-of-nature. That is, the high
state occurs with endogenous probability p(e); which is increasing in the e¤ort exerted by the
CEO. For example, this e¤ort is the time and resources employed to search for new investment
opportunities. E¤ort is not observable by the shareholder and the CEOs compensation cannot
be contingent on it. This is the source of agency conict in our model.3 We assume that
p(e) = e; and solve for the optimal e¤ort directly as a function of p; that is
e(p) = p:
Providing e¤ort is costly for the CEO with an increasing and convex cost function c (p) :We
assume that there is a minimum e¤ort level needed to run the rm:
p  p = R  a
l
ah   al ; (2)
with c0(p) = 0. This assumption ensures that debt has a positive expected net payo¤ ruling out
the trivial case in which d = 0.
At t0 the shareholder proposes a compensation contract to the CEO. The contract consists
of a xed salary F  0 and a variable payment that is a percentage  2 [0; 1] of the rms
prot at the end of the period. If the CEO accepts the compensation contract, she must decide
at t0 how much e¤ort to exert and how much to borrow. If the CEO rejects the contract her
reservation compensation is A.
At time t1 and state s, the CEO has to repay the debt and interests. If the return on the
investment is not enough to repay, the CEO can sell part of the core assets, f s, to the unskilled
investor for a price qs. As we show below, the purchase price the unskilled investor pays is
below the value of the long-term asset, qs < b; thus we refer to these sales as re sales.
We denote the rms prot at t1 as
s1 = b(k   f s) + qsf s + (as  R) d:
We focus on non-default equilibria. That is, equilibria that satisfy the following non-negativity
constraint:
qsf s + (as  R) d  0: (3)
In other words, we assume that, after the re sales, all debt and interests are repaid. As
explained below, this non-default constraint will help prevent losses in equilibrium.
3E¤ort aversion has been studied by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Harris and Raviv (1979), among many
others.
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2.2 The investors problem
At t1; the investor can buy some of the core assets from the rm at price qs per unit. We
refer to the investor as unskilled because to manage x units of core assets she has to pay
a quadratic cost 1
2
vx2; with v  0. The parameter v captures the marginal loss from early
liquidation. Like in Krugman (1998), these costs are real costs which reduce total output;
that is, they are not mere transfers across agents. For example, these costs can be inferior
management or informational skills of the investor relative to the rms CEO.4 Therefore,
selling core assets is negative-NPV.
In equilibrium, by market clearing, the assets bought at t1 by the unskilled investor equal
the assets sold by the rms CEO, f s. The unskilled investor maximizes the value she would
get from the assets purchased at price qs net of purchase costs. That is,
max
fs
E

bf s   qsf s   1
2
v (f s)2

;
subject to f s  0: The rst-order-condition yields the price function
qs  q(f s) = b  vf s: (4)
This is the price at which the investor would buy core assets from the CEO at t1: It is decreasing
in the volume of purchases because the cost of managing the assets increases in their volume.
For positive sales, the price is always below the assets fundamental value, b, that is, the value
if it remains managed by the rm.
2.3 The CEOs problem
Like in Gabaix (2014), the CEO does not correctly internalize the price function (4). That
is, she makes decisions at t0 assuming
qsm  qm(f s) = b mvf s; (5)
with m 2 (0; 1]: For m < 1 the CEO overvalues the asset prices at which she expects to sell in
the low state of nature. Thus, we interpret m as a measure of the CEOs optimism: smaller m
would correspond to larger optimism.
Because the CEO would never sell at a negative price, re sales will be limited to the range
fm  f s  0, where fm satises qm
 
fm

= 0; or fm = bmv : We assume that, for any m, the
parameters satisfy
fm  k: (6)
Assumption (6) together with the non-default constraint (3) prevent the rm from entering
into losses. Allowing rm losses is equivalent to removing assumptions (3), (6), and introducing
4For example, the Financial Times (2012) reported that many funds buying mortgages from Spanish banks
incurred signicant costs to understand and assess their values.
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restrictions on limited-liability for both the CEO and the shareholder. Payo¤s will then exhibit
a kink.It is well understood that limited liability may induce risk-shifting and overleverage
(see, for instance, John et al. 2000). Our model generates overleverage through a di¤erent
channel: managerial optimism.5
At the end of the period, the CEOs expected discounted payments are
G(fh; f l; d; p) = F + V (fh; f l; d; p); (7)
where
V (fh; f l; d; p) = ph1 + (1  p)l1; (8)
is the rms expected prot at t1:
The CEO takes as given the xed and variable payments (F and ) and decides the level
of debt and e¤ort to maximize her expected discounted payments net of the e¤ort cost:6
max
d;p;fh;f l
G(fh; f l; d; p)  c(p); (9)
subject to (2), (3), the non-negative restrictions on f s and d, and to her expected re sales price
function (5). Replacing fh, f l, and d in the rms expected prot (8), V (fh; f l; d; p) becomes
a function of p and m that we denote as V (p;m).
2.4 The shareholders problem
At t0, the shareholder proposes a compensation contract (F; ) to maximize the rms
expected prot net of the CEOs compensation. Thus, he solves
max
F;
(1  )V (p;m)  F;
subject to F  0,  2 [0; 1], the debt, e¤ort and re sales which solve the CEOs problem, and
to the CEOs participation constraint
F + V (p;m)  c(p)  A: (10)
3 Ine¢ cient market equilibrium
First we identify the socially e¢ cient allocations. Then we solve the CEOs problem and
characterize the compensation contract proposed by the shareholder. Managerial optimism
5The non-default constraint (3) and condition (6) prevent the kink. These restrictions together with the
assumption of risk neutrality make the model much more tractable and the intuitions more straight forward.
On the other side, these assumptions will a¤ect the shareholders optimal contract choice. We discuss the
implications of these assumptions in Section 4.
6Because of (3), choosing the level of debt is equivalent to selecting the asset sales. As we will show below,
it is never optimal to sell core assets in the high state of nature. In the low state the manager sells the core
assets needed for (3) to be binding.
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leads to socially ine¢ cient overleverage. When e¤ort is endogenous, leverage is shown to in-
crease further due to the complementarity between CEO choices of leverage and e¤ort. More
importantly, the shareholder, even if he is not optimistic, has no incentive to correct the CEO.
This result questions the e¢ cacy of say-on-pay regulation to prevent excessive rm leverage.
3.1 Social e¢ ciency
The social ine¢ ciency is due to the resources the unskilled investor wastes when she ac-
quires core assets (v > 0) : Pareto-e¢ cient allocations optimize that waste of resources. Opti-
mizing the waste does not eliminate such waste entirely, since such a result is only possible when
debt is zero. But zero debt is not optimal since the expected return from debt is positive. The
optimal leverage is achieved when the rms CEO selects the right level of debt while correctly
internalizing (m = 1) the costs of the potential re sales associated with debt. This is what we
show in the next proposition:
Proposition 1 An allocation x =

d; fh; f l; p
	
is Pareto optimum if and only if whoever makes
the leverage, e¤ort and re sales decisions internalizes the price function (4). That is, when
m = 1.
The intuition is that, in our model, the First Welfare Theorem fails because the CEO
does not use the right price function (4). Optimism distorts the information content of prices,
inducing the CEO to choose excessive debt and re sales. Fire sales entail a real cost for society
because v > 0 is not a mere wealth transfer. A social planner could improve social welfare by
reducing debt and the waste of resources in the low state of nature. The planner could then
redistribute the gains from the Pareto e¢ cient output to ensure everybody is better o¤.
3.2 CEOs choices
The following proposition characterizes the solution to the CEOs problem.
Proposition 2 For variable payments  > 0, both debt and re sales in the low state increase
with e¤ort p and with CEOs optimism (lower m means more optimism). That is, @d
@m
< 0;
@f l
@m
< 0; @d
@p
> 0; @f
l
@p
> 0: The levels of debt and re sales are:
d =
b2
(R  al) 4mv
 
1 

(1  p)(R  al)
p(ah  R)
2!
; (11)
fh = 0; and f l =
b
2mv

1  (1  p)(R  a
l)
p(ah  R)

: (12)
E¤ort, p(;m), is implicitly dened by the incentive compatibility constraint,

@V (p;m)
@p
= c0(p): (13)
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E¤ort increases with variable payments, , and decreases with m. Moreover,
@2p
@m@
< 0: (14)
When e¤ort is endogenous, the total e¤ect of optimism (m) on borrowing, @d
@m
, works through
two channels that can be decomposed as follows:
@d
@m
=
@d
@m
 p| {z }
Direct channel
+
@d
@p
@p
@m| {z } :
Indirect channel
(15)
We denote by @d
@m
jp the e¤ect of m on d holding e¤ort constant. This is the direct channel
well known in models of managerial optimism: for a given xed e¤ort, higher optimism (smaller
m) leads to a larger overestimation of the revenues from re sales and, ultimately, more debt.
When e¤ort p is endogenous there is a second, indirect channel in (15). Through this
new channel, endogenous e¤ort reinforces overborrowing because there is a complementarity
between e¤ort and leverage, @d
@p
> 0. Leverage is more protable when e¤ort is higher since
more e¤ort makes the high state of nature more likely. Moreover, e¤ort is higher when the
CEO overestimates the revenues from re sales, @p
@m
< 0: Therefore, CEOs optimism makes
overborrowing larger when e¤ort is endogenous than when it is exogenous, that is, @d
@p
@p
@m
< 0.
Result (14) says that more optimistic managers are more sensitive to compensation incen-
tives. Hence, the e¤ects of optimism on e¤ort
 
@p
@m
< 0

; and thus the importance of the indirect
channel in (15), are larger the higher the variable payment.
We denote as p and f l the e¢ cient choices of e¤ort and re sales corresponding to m = 1.
An optimistic CEO (m < 1) exerts an e¤ort higher than the e¢ cient level of e¤ort,
p(;m) > p; (16)
and overborrows:
d > d =
b2
(R  al)4v
 
1 

(1  p)(R  al)
p(ah  R)
2!
: (17)
In the low state, the re sales expected by the optimistic CEO are larger than the e¢ cient level
of re sales:
f l > f l

=
b
2v

1  (1  p
)(R  al)
p(ah  R)

; (18)
but lower than the actual re sales f^ l needed to avoid bankruptcy in the low state:
q(f^ l)f^ l + (al  R)d = 0:
The social ine¢ ciency arises because the optimistic CEO expects that, in the low state of
nature, she will sell f l units at price qlm given by (5). Accordingly, she borrows d in (11).
However, re sales will take place at price ql given by (4). Since the re sale price is lower
than expected by the CEO she ends up selling too many core assets (f^ l) to avoid default which
depresses re sales prices even further.
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3.3 Equilibrium Contract
The next proposition characterizes the contract selected by the shareholder. The CEO
wants to be compensated up to her reservation salary: Optimism makes her underestimate the
costs from asset sales, overestimate rms prots and thus accept a lower share of them as
compensation
 
@
@m
> 0

.
Proposition 3 For a given m  1, the shareholder o¤ers a contract with no xed salary
(F = 0) and a percentage of the rms prot ( < 1) which is smaller the larger the CEOs
optimism (m smaller):
@
@m
> 0: (19)
The CEOs participation constraint is binding at her reservation compensation, A.
In the next proposition we show that the shareholder, even if he is rational, has no incentive
to correct the CEOs ine¢ cient overleverage.7
Proposition 4 The shareholders expected prot at t1 net of the executive compensation, is
V (p;m)  c(p) A: The variation of this net prot with respect to the CEOs optimism can be
written as
@ (V (p;m)  c(p)  A)
@m
=
@V^ (p;m)
@m
 p| {z }
(> 0)
Social cost of optimism
+
@(p;m)
@m
 p| {z }
(< 0)
Wealth transfer
+
@ [V (p;m)  c(p)]
@p
@p
@m| {z }
(< 0)
Enhanced e¤ort
< 0;
(20)
where @V^ (p;m)
@m
jp denotes the variation of V^ (p;m) with respect to m when p is constant. We use
similar notation for @(p;m)
@m
j p: V^ (p;m) is the rms expected prot at the actual level of re
sales in the low state:
V^ (p;m) = p((ah  R)d+ bk) + (1  p)b(k   f^ l): (21)
 represents the optimistic CEOs overestimation of the rms prot at t1,
(p;m) = V (p;m)  V^ (p;m) = (1  p)b(f^ l   f l) > 0: (22)
Proposition 4 shows that the shareholder proposes a compensation package that optimizes
his return but is socially ine¢ cient. Equation (20) decomposes the result into three components.
The rst component in the right hand side of (20) is what we call social cost of optimism.
For a given level of e¤ort, optimism (m < 1) results into overleverage (Proposition 2) and, in
7By rational we mean that the shareholder is aware that re sales prices are actually determined by (4) and
not by (5).
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the case of the low state, excessive re sales. This erodes the rms prots and the shareholders
net payo¤; that is, @V^ (p;m)
@m
> 0.
The second component in the right hand side of (20) is what we call the wealth transfer
from the CEO to the shareholder, . An optimistic CEO, because she overestimates the rms
prots, savesshareholders part of her compensation. We refer to this as a wealth transfer to
the shareholder.8 Notice that this component and the rst component would arise even if e¤ort
were exogenous.
The third and last component in the right hand side of (20) is what we call the enhanced
e¤ort channel. Optimism encourages the CEO to leverage more and provide more e¤ort (Propo-
sition 2). This is valuable to the shareholder because higher e¤ort reduces the probability of
the low state of nature. This component arises only when e¤ort is endogenously determined.
The rst component of (20) induces the shareholder to correct the CEO. However, the
second and third components show that, because of the unpaid extra e¤ort that optimistic
CEOs provide, the shareholder is better o¤ by letting the CEO overleverage.
4 Regulation
In the previous section we showed that when CEOs are optimistic, the unregulated market
equilibrium is ine¢ cient. The CEO overborrows and the shareholder, even if he is not optimistic,
has no incentive to correct the CEO. In this section we analyze two tools to induce social
e¢ ciency. First, we restrict shareholderschoices on the structure (although not the level) of
executive compensation. That is, we impose a cap on the variable relative to the xed salary.
Second, we directly regulate the leverage level, like with standard capital requirements or the
leverage restrictions discussed by Korinek and Jeanne (2014). Finally, we compare the two
policy tools.
4.1 Regulating executive compensation
The regulator imposes a cap T on the ratio of variable-to-xed CEOs compensation,9
T  V (p;m)
F
: (23)
The shareholder is constrained by the cap when he designs the CEOs compensation and alters
the compensation contract:
8At t0, the CEO based her decisions on the price function (5) and agreed to work in exchange for her
reservation compensation plus her e¤ort cost. However, if the low state arrives, it is the price function (4) that
governs asset prices. Asset prices are lower than expected by the optimistic CEO, thus the actual re sales will
be larger than expected

f^ l > f l

and prots and payments to the CEO are smaller. The CEO is ultimately
paid less than her reservation utility.
9We use the subscript T to denote the solutions to this restricted problem.
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Proposition 5 The shareholder proposes a contract in which the cap constraint (23) is binding.
The variable payments increase as the cap is relaxed, @T
@T
> 0: The xed salary is
FT =
A+ c(pT )
(1 + T )
> 0: (24)
E¤ort is a function of  via (13) : As the cap becomes tighter (smaller T ), the variable share
decreases and the CEO has less incentive to provide e¤ort (@pT
@T
> 0). Lower e¤ort leads to
lower leverage and fewer re sales in the low state of nature.
It is important to stress that there is a tradeo¤ between achieving the socially e¢ cient level
of debt, d, dened in (17) and the e¢ cient amount of e¤ort, p, dened in (16) : For anym < 1,
achieving d implies an e¤ort provision lower than the socially e¢ cient level p. On the other
side, inducing p implies ine¢ cient overleverage dT > d. This tradeo¤ exists because the cap
T reduces variable payments and this discourages the executive from providing e¤ort.
Figure 1 illustrates this tradeo¤ numerically.10 The gure plots in the x-axis di¤erent levels
of the cap T . In the y-axis, the top panel plots the CEOs debt choice while the bottom panel
plots her e¤ort level. Both panels include the e¢ cient levels of debt and e¤ort (d and p,
respectively).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Figure 1 shows that as the cap is tighter (T smaller) the regulator prevents the shareholder
from providing too much variable pay. As a consequence the CEO exerts less e¤ort and borrows
less. The complementarity between e¤ort and leverage implies that as debt moves towards the
optimal d in the top panel then e¤ort becomes smaller than the e¢ cient level p in the bottom
panel. In other words, to lower leverage regulators need to lower the share of variable pay,
which ultimately disincentives e¤ort provision.
Alternatively, if the regulator is targeting a socially e¢ cient provision of e¤ort p in the
bottom panel, the top panel shows that the corresponding cap on variable compensation leads
the CEO to overleverage relative to the e¢ cient level of debt d.
4.2 Regulating leverage
We assume in this section that the CEO solves the problem (7) subject to the same re-
strictions plus an additional restriction on debt imposed by the regulators.11
10We assume the following parameter values for all gures:
Parameters
ah = 1:1 al = 0:9 R = 1 A = 0:05
v = 1 k = 5:25 b = 1:05
Since the marginal utility of e¤ort is increasing in p, we use a functional form convex enough to ensure an
interior solution for e¤ort: c(p) = 6(p  p)3.
11We use the subscript d to denote the solutions to this restricted problem. The proofs in this section follow
immediately from the proof of Proposition 2 after including the debt constraint (25).
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d  d: (25)
When the debt constraint is binding,12 the CEO chooses debt d, re sales fhd = 0 in the
state s = h, and
f ld(
d) =
b
2mv
 
1 
r
1  (R  a
l)4mv
b2
d
!
; (26)
in the state s = l. E¤ort p(; d;m) is implicitly dened by the incentive compatibility constraint,

@V (p; d;m)
@p
= c0(p): (27)
where V (p; d;m) is the expected prot function:
V (p; d;m) = bk + d(p(ah  R)  (1  p)(R  al))  (1  p)mv  f ld( d)2 :
The optimal contract implies Fd = 0 and a share d of prots such that the participation
constraint is binding:
dV (pd; d;m) = c(pd) + A: (28)
Constraints (27) and (28) jointly determine d and pd = p(d; d;m).
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
Figure 2 displays the levels of debt and e¤ort for di¤erent levels of the cap on leverage. If
the cap is too lose the CEO overborrows and provides excessive e¤ort.
4.3 Comparing regulations
A natural question is whether, from the point of view of the regulator, any of the two tools
(a cap on variable pay or a cap on debt) is preferable. The following proposition shows that a
cap on debt is a better policy tool because it can achieve the socially e¢ cient level of debt with
a higher provision of e¤ort.
Proposition 6 Given a cap on the variable compensation T  that yields the socially e¢ cient
level of debt d, the CEOs optimal provision of e¤ort, pT , is lower than the e¤ort pd exerted
by the same CEO when the cap on variable compensation is replaced with a cap d = d on
debt. Moreover, the variable compensation in the later case, d is higher than the variable
compensation in the former, T .
12If the leverage constraint (25) is not binding, the CEOs optimal choice is characterized in Proposition 2
and the contract in Proposition 3.
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Both policy tools can achieve the optimal level of debt. However, the cap on variable pay
leads to a higher distortion in the provision of e¤ort. It imposes a xed salary higher than what
shareholders would choose if they were free to select the compensation contract that delivers the
socially optimal level of debt. Since higher xed salary discourages e¤ort, the cap on variable
compensation makes the low state of nature (a crisis) more likely than the cap on leverage.13
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
Figure 3 conrms our previous result. When caps are set such that both policy tools induce
the socially optimal debt level d, the cap on debt (dotted line, right scale) induces higher
e¤ort and variable compensation than the cap on compensation (dashed line, left scale). In
other words, if the level of debt measures the size of a crisis, then both tools ensure crises of
the same size. However, regulating compensation makes crises more likely.
It is worth discussing now the generality of Proposition 6 in the light of the simplifying
assumptions that we have made to render the model more tractable. Restrictions (3) and (6)
prevent the rm to enter in losses at t1 in the low state. As a consequence, the limited-liability
restriction will never be binding. Removing these restrictions and allowing rm losses may
result in an optimal contract with positive xed payments (F > 0) necessary to meet the
limited-liability constraint. This may be the case even when there exists a cap on debt. The
assumption of risk-neutrality implies that the CEO needs not be compensated for the extra risk
she assumes when she is induced to expend costly e¤ort by the shareholder. This is captured
by the incentive compatibility constraint (13) or, alternatively, the constraint (27) if debt is
restricted. If the CEO is risk-averse, a risk-premium must be paid. This will likely imply a
positive xed payment necessary to meet the CEOs (binding) participation constraint. Hence,
removing our simplifying assumptions will likely result in a positive xed payment when debt
is restricted.
Heuristically, the intuition in Proposition 6 should hold as long as the xed payment neces-
sary to attain the socially optimal leverage (FT ) when the variable bonus is capped is higher
than the shareholders optimal xed salary under the leverage cap (Fd). Theoretically, this
will depend, among other things, on the CEOs risk-aversion, her disutility of e¤ort and her
reservation salary.
5 Empirical predictions
The model generates a number of empirical predictions involving rm leverage (dened as
assets to equity), executives e¤ort and compensation. We outline the predictions below.
First, optimism is positively associated with leverage and e¤ort, and this e¤ect is larger
13Proposition 6 shows that the leverage restriction is better than the cap on variable compensation because
it achieves the optimal debt level d and gets closer to the optimal e¤ort level. This does not necessarily mean
that the planner would choose that leverage restriction, because the planner would optimize over the entire
(d; p) space.
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in sectors (rms) in which the executives e¤ort plays a relevant role in the success of any
investment. This includes, for example, sectors in which executivessoft skills and information
acquisition are key for the investment success. Among these sectors (rms), those with higher
leverage should have their executives exerting higher e¤ort

@d
@p
> 0

: There has been some
work on the rst part of the prediction, but not on the other components. For example, Ben-
David et al. (2013) nd some evidence that rms with optimistic executives invest more and
have more debt. Malmendier et al. (2011) nd that optimistic managers use leverage more
aggressively. The long hours usually associated with the nancial industry may be anecdotal
evidence for the complementarity between e¤ort and leverage.
Second, Otto (2014) nds that rms prot from the overcondence of CEOs who overesti-
mate the future value of the rms equity by granting fewer stock options and lower bonuses.
Our theory adds a cross-sectional dimension: shareholders will take advantage of this feature
especially in sectors in which e¤ort is less observable and leverage is higher, like the nancial
industry. In these two cases Proposition 4 shows that the gains for shareholders from the unpaid
enhanced e¤ort are larger.
Third, there is a growing empirical literature showing that asset booms and leverage are
positively correlated (see for example, Jorda et al. 2013). If we assume that optimism is more
likely in periods of asset booms then our model predicts that episodes of rapid increases in cor-
porate leverage (like the recent experiences of emerging markets) are associated with increases
in the variable share of compensation. This is because optimistic executives overvalue the vari-
able pay and shareholders may have no incentives to undo this bias as we showed in Proposition
4. Moreover, our theory would predict that if some countries favor variable compensation more
than others (for example, di¤erent scal treatments) the elasticity of leverage growth to asset
price growth would be larger. This may be of interest for cross-country studies linking leverage
and asset prices, like Giacomini et al. (2014).
Finally, our model predicts that say-on-pay regulation will not help in mitigating leverage
in periods of asset booms and optimism. In fact, say-on-pay can reinforce overborrowing if
shareholders design contracts to prot from optimistic CEOs. This may lead to testable predic-
tions comparing countries with di¤erent say-on-pay regimes. Similarly, proposition 6 suggests
that imposing a cap on variable compensation distorts e¤ort more than regulating leverage.
Empirical work could analyze whether di¤erent regulations of executive compensation alter the
frequency of rmsre-sales or defaults across countries.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a model with endogenous determination of leverage, ex-
ecutive compensation and CEOs e¤ort. Overborrowing arises due to CEOs optimism. Our
insights come from making the CEOs e¤ort endogenous and non-contractible.
Our results show that when executives are optimistic about asset prices in states of distress,
shareholders propose compensation packages that lead to socially excessive leverage. This
result provides support for regulation and suggests that say-on-pay regimes may induce greater
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leverage. This result may motivate further empirical work because Correa and Lel (2016) show
that say-on-pay laws have lead to substantial changes in executive compensation.
We nd that, at least for risk-neutral agents, the optimal regulation is not the regulation of
executive compensation. A cap on debt is socially more e¢ cient: it can restore the e¢ cient level
of debt with a lower distortion in managerial e¤ort. In any case, decreasing leverage reduces
the losses of nancial distress, but simultaneously weakens the incentives (i.e. e¤ort) necessary
to make crises less likely.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is similar to showing that the First Welfare Theorem fails when one agent uses
distorted prices. Optimism is distorting the prices used by the CEO. To trace the Pareto
Frontier of e¢ cient allocations, we solve the problem of a planner who chooses the e¢ cient
allocation of production among the set of feasible allocations and then redistributes the output
among the agents using lump-sum taxes or transfers

T s; ~T s

in zero net supply.
By denition, the payments to the shareholder and to the CEO must add up to rms
prots. We can dene the rms expected prot net of transfers and e¤ort cost as
UB = E (
s
1 + T
s   c(p)) : (A1)
The expected prot of the unskilled investor net of transfers is dened as
UU = E

bf s   qsf s   1
2
v (f s)2 + ~T s

: (A2)
The transfers must be in zero net supply:
T st + ~T
s
t = 0; 8t, 8s: (A3)
Denition 1 The set of feasible allocations is the set F =

d; fh; f l; p
	
such that the following
equations hold: (2), (3), d > 0, and market clearing in asset sales.
Denition 2 P  F denotes the set of Pareto allocations. That is, for all allocations x =
d; fh; f l; p
	 2 P there is no other allocation x0 2 F for which there exists a system of transfersn
T st ;
~T st
o
satisfying (A3) such that UB (x0)  UB (x) ; UU (x0)  UU (x) with at least one the
previous inequalities being strict inequality.
The planner problem traces the Pareto Frontier when maximizing a weighted sum of the
expected prots of rms and unskilled investors among the allocations in the feasibility set F:
Denoting the social weight of the unskilled investor as 1  	  0 , the social planner solves for
U = max
d;p;ffs;T st ; ~T st gs=h;l
n
(1 	)UB (d; f s; T st ) + 	UU

~f s; ~T st
o
; (A4)
subject to

d; fh; f l; p
	 2 F and to the zero-net supply transfers (A3).
The set of FOCs from problem (A4) includes the price function (4). Thus, any allocation
decided by the CEO using (5) with m < 1 leads to a suboptimal level of re sales, and to lower
output because the costs paid by the unskilled investor are wasted resources. Those allocations
cannot be Pareto e¢ cient because, for any weight 	; the planner could always choose an
allocation solving her problem (thus using the price function (4)). The planners allocation will
have higher total output by denition of the Pareto frontier. Then the planner can redistribute
the higher output to make everybody better o¤. In other words, the First Welfare Theorem
applies to our economy when the agents use the right prices.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
We remove the subscript m to simplify the notation. For s = fl; hg, the CEO solves
max
fh;f l;d;p
G(fh; f l; d; p) c(p) subject to (3), f  f s  0, d  0, p  p, and qs(f s) = b mvf s. We
dene the Lagrangian function L(fh; f l; d; p) = G(fh; f l; d; p)  c(p) + h(fhqh + (ah  R)d) +
l(f lql+(al R)d+'h   f   fh+'l   f   f l+ hfh+ lf l+d+(p p); with the non-negative
Lagrange multipliers s;  s; , and . In addition, the following slackness conditions must hold:
h(fhqh + (ah   R)d) = 0; l(f lql + (al   R)d) = 0; 'h   f   fh = 0; 'l   f   f l = 0;  hfh =
0;  lf l = 0; d = 0; (p  p) = 0: The FOCs are:
hb  2mvfh(p + h) +  h = 'h; (A5)
lb  2mvf l((1  p) + l) +  l = 'l; (A6)
+ (p + h)(ah  R) = ((1  p) + l)(R  al); (A7)
@G(fh; f l; d; p)
@p
+  = c0(p): (A8)
First, we analyze re sales in the high state, fh. Assume d > 0 (to be proved below). The
slackness conditions and the assumption (ah   R) > 0 imply h = 0 and  = 0. By the same
conditions, an interior solution ( f > fh > 0) would imply  h = 'h = 0: Then, from (A5), it
follows that fh = 0.
We turn now to the re sales in the low state, f l. Assuming again d > 0, and given
(R   al) > 0; in the low state of nature the CEO needs to sell f l > 0 to cover debt and
interest payments. By the slackness conditions, f l > 0 leads to  l = 0. Then, (A7) implies
l = (1   p)

p(ah R)
(1 p)(R al)   1

 0; which holds with equality for p = p: Now we prove
that the non-negativity constraint (3) is binding in the low state. Assume it is not binding.
Then l = 0 because of the slackness conditions. Given (A7), if p > p; the multiplier  =

 
(1  p)(R  al)  p(ah  R) < 0, which contradicts the non-negativity assumption of the
multipliers. Thus, for p > p; f lql + (al  R)d = 0 and we obtain the level of debt characterized
in Proposition 2. We prove now that f l < f . Assume f = f . Then,  l = 0; by the slackness
conditions. Replacing l in (A6), it follows that 'l =  (1   p)

p(ah R)
(1 p)(R al) + 1

b < 0: This
contradicts the non-negativity assumption of the multipliers. Hence, f l < f and, by the
slackness conditions, 'l = 0: Replacing l in (A6), it follows that f l is positive if and only if
p > p. Therefore, given d = q
lf l
(R al) , condition (2) is necessary and su¢ cient for d > 0 and
@G(fh;f l;d;p)
@p
> 0. Since we have assumed c0(p) = 0, then (A8) implies that p > p, and the
slackness condition implies  = 0.
Replacing fh, f l, and d in the rms expected prot, V (fh; f l; d; p), we can be write it as a
function of p and m:
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V (p;m) = bk + p
b2
4mv
 
ah  R
(R  al)

1  (1  p)(R  a
l)
p(ah  R)
2
> 0: (A9)
Thus, we can write (A8) as follows:

b2
4mv
R  al
ah  R
 
1 +
ah  R
R  al
2
  1
p2
!
= c0(p): (A10)
The left-hand-side of (A10) is the derivative of the CEOs variable payments relative to her
e¤ort, that we denote by  @V (p;m)
@p
. A su¢ cient condition for the solution to the CEOs problem
to be a local maximum is that the Lagrangian function evaluated at the optimal is negative
semidenite. This condition requires all the rst principal minors of the Hessian matrix for the
Lagrangian function to be non-positive. We assume that the inequality is strict:

@2V (p;m)
@p2
  c00(p) < 0: (A11)
By the Implicit Function Theorem, taking the derivative of (A10) with respect tom and solving
for @p
@m
we obtain @p
@m
=   @2V
@p@m

 @
2V
@p2
  c00(p)
 1
. The result @p
@m
< 0 follows from @
2V
@p@m
< 0 and
(A11). Taking the derivative of @p
@m
with respect to , and given the signs of the the partial
derivatives, it is immediate to prove (14).
Likewise, the derivative of e¤ort with respect to  can be implicitly derived from the CEOs
incentive compatibility condition (A10): @p
@
=  @V (p;m)
@p

 @
2V
@p2
  c00(p)
 1
> 0: The inequality
follows from @V (p;m)
@p
> 0; and (A11).
Proof of Proposition 3
The shareholder proposes a contract (F; ) that maximizes her revenue,
max
F;
(1  )V (p;m)  F (A12)
subject to  @
@p
V (p;m) = c0(p); F + V (p;m)   c(p)  A;   0;   1; and F  0. The
corresponding Lagrangian is: L(F; ) = (1  )V (p;m) F + 1( @@pV (p;m)  c0(p)) + 2(F +
V (p;m)  c(p) A) + 3 + 4(1  ) + 5F: The non-negative multipliers are 1 to 5. The
following slackness conditions must hold: 2(F +V (p;m) c(p) A) = 0; 3 = 0; 4(1 ) =
0; 5F = 0: The FOCs are:
2   1 + 5 = 0; (A13)
@V (p;m)
@p
@p
@
(1  ) + (2   1)V (p;m) + 3   4 = 0: (A14)
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We can show that it is optimal for the shareholder to propose F = 0 and  < 1. First, by
contradiction we prove that F > 0 and 0 <  < 1 cannot be a solution. Assume F > 0 and
0 <  < 1. Then 3 = 4 = 5 = 0 by the slackness conditions, and 2 = 1 by (A13). Then,
given (A14), @V (p;m)
@p
@p
@
(1  ) = 0; which can only be true for  = 1. We show now that F = 0
and 0 <  < 1 is a solution. If we assume so, then, by the slackness conditions, 3 = 4 = 0.
From (A13) and (A14), @V (p;m)
@p
@p
@
(1  ) = 5V (p;m), which holds if and only if 5 > 0. This
is consistent with F = 0. Finally, given (A9), (1  )V (p;m) > 0 for any  < 1. This rules out
F  0 and  = 1 as a solution. Therefore, at the optimal, F = 0 and 0 <  < 1.
The participation constraint is binding:
V (p;m) = c(p) + A: (A15)
Given the incentive compatibility constraint (13), it is suboptimal to pay the CEO any com-
pensation above her reservation utility net of the cost of e¤ort. It would not increase the CEOs
e¤ort and it would decrease the shareholders net prot. The optimal variable payment  and
e¤ort p are jointly determined by the incentive and by the participation constraints.
Taking the total derivative of V (p;m)   c(p)   A = 0 with respect to m and using the
incentive compatibility constraint (13), it follows that
@
@m
=   @V (p;m)
@m
(V (p;m)) 1 > 0:
The inequality follows from V (p;m) being positive and decreasing in m.
Proof of Proposition 4
The shareholders expected prot net of the CEOs compensation is (1   )V (p;m)   F .
If the CEOs participation constraint is binding, V (p;m) +F = A+ c(p). Replacing the later
in the former, the shareholders net prot becomes V (p;m)   c(p)   A. Taking the derivative
of the shareholders prot with respect to m we obtain
@(V (p;m)  c(p)  A)
@m
=
@V (p;m)
@m
 p+ @(V (p;m)  c(p))
@p
@p
@m
< 0: (A16)
The rst term in (A16) represents the variation of V (p;m) with respect tom when p is constant.
It is negative, @V (p;m)
@m
 p < 0; because of (A9). From the FOC (13) and Proposition 3,  =
c0(p)

@V (p;m)
@p
 1
< 1. Hence, @(V (p;m) c(p))
@p
> 0. Finally, from Proposition 3, @p
@m
< 0.
The actual re sales in the low state, f^ l, are calculated such that q(f^ l)f^ l + (al   R)d = 0:
Replacing d from Proposition 2 in the later equation we obtain
f^ l =
b
2v
0@1 
vuut 1
m
 
(1  p)(R  al)
p(ah  R)
2
  (1 m)
!1A : (A17)
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Substituting (A17) into V (p;m); we obtain equation (21). The inequality (20) follows after
replacing (21) and (22) into (A16).
Taking the derivative of (21) with respect to m we obtain
@V^ (p;m)
@m
 p = b
4vm2
 
1 

(1  p)(R  al)
p(ah  R)
2!
p(ah  R)
R  al
0BB@
r
(1 p)(R al)
p(ah R)
2
mr
(1 p)(R al)
p(ah R)
2
+ (m  1)
  1
1CCA :
This expression is strictly positive for all m < 1 if and only if

(1 p)(R al)
p(ah R)
2
(m 1) > (m  1) :
This is equivalent to (1 p)(R a
l)
p(ah R) < 1, which follows from parameter restriction (2). Moreover,
@V^ (p;m)
@m
 p = 0 for m = 1. Finally, for m = 1 we have @f^ l
@m
< 0 and f^ l = f l. Hence, f^ l > f l for
all m < 1. Given (22), it follows that @
@m
 p < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
The shareholder solves the same problem as in (A12) but replacing the non negativity
constraint on F with the condition TF  V (p;m). The Lagrangian is dened as before. The
last slackness condition becomes 5(TF   V (p;m)) = 0: The FOCs with respect to F and 
are:
2   1 + T5 = 0; (A18)
@V (p;m)
@p
@p
@
(1  (1 + 5)) + (2   1  5)V (p;m) + 3   4 = 0: (A19)
As it was shown in the proof of Proposition 3, T > 0 and 3 = 0. By contradiction, we
show now that T < 1. Assume T = 1. Then (A19) implies that  @V (p;m)@p @p@5 + (2   1  
5)V (p;m)   4 = 0. Given (A18), a necessary condition for this equality is 5 < 2   1 < 0.
This contradicts the non-negativity condition on the multipliers. Hence, T < 1 and, by the
corresponding slack condition, 4 = 0.
We prove by contradiction that 5 > 0. Assume 5 = 0. By (A18), 2 = 1. Replacing these
values in (A19) the FOC becomes @V (p;m)
@p
@p
@
(1  ) = 4. Since T < 1 the FOC implies 4 > 0
which contradicts the slackness condition. Hence, 5 > 0: This implies:
TV (pT ;m) = TFT : (A20)
Assume 2 > 0. Then (24) follows from replacing (A20) in the binding participation con-
straint. Replacing (24) in the binding slackness condition (A20), the optimal  must satisfy:
TV (pT ;m) =
T
1 + T
(c(pT ) + A) : (A21)
From (A21), @T
@T
= c(pT )+A
(1+T )2

V (pT ) +
c0(pT )
1+T
@pT
@
 1
> 0: Hence, the optimal variable payment
incentive increases as the cap constraint on the variable variable payment is relaxed.
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Proof of Proposition 6
We dene the cap on variable compensation T  such that the CEO chooses an amount of debt
equal to d. In other words, comparing (11) and (17), pT  is such that
1 

(1  p)(R  al)
p(ah  R)
2
=
1
m
 
1 

(1  pT )(R  al)
pT (ah  R)
2!
:
To induce e¤ort pT , T  is chosen such that the incentive compatibility constraint (13) and
the slack condition (A21) are jointly satised. This, together with (24), yields the optimal
contract (FT  ; T ).
Alternatively, we impose a cap d = d on the CEOs debt such that she chooses precisely
an amount of debt d. The shareholders optimal contract and the level of e¤ort chosen by
the CEO must jointly satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (27) and the participation
constraint (28).
We show rst that pT  is suboptimal for the CEO in this case. By denition,
@V (pT ;m)
@p
=
@V (p;d;m)
@p
: Replace pT  in (27) for d = d. Hence, comparing (13) and (27) it follows that
d = T . Replace the later in (28). By denition, V (pT  ; d;m) = V (pT  ;m). Given (A21) it
follows that, for any T  > 0, T V (pT  ; d;m)   c(pT )   A < 0. In other words, the contract
(0; T ) and the debt cap d = d induce the CEOs e¤ort pT  and the socially e¢ cient level of
debt d but undercompensate the CEO.
Finally, we show that, to obtain the socially e¢ cient level of debt, the optimal contract with
a cap on debt must include a larger variable compensation to induce a larger amount of e¤ort.
Let us solve for c0(p) in (27) and replace it in (28). We can then express the participation
constraint as a function of the CEOs e¤ort as follows:
c0(p)

@V (p; d;m)
@p
 1
V (p; d;m)  c(p)  A = 0 (A22)
Taking the partial derivative of the left-hand side with respect to p yields
c00(p)

@V (p; d;m)
@p
 1
V (p; d;m) > 0:
Hence, to satisfy (A22) the optimal e¤ort pd > pT  : Finally, given the incentive compatibility
constraint (27), inducing higher e¤ort implies that d > T .
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Figures
Figure 1. Regulating Executive Compensation. This gure compares the market
equilibrium with an optimistic CEO (m = 0:5) with the socially optimal case (rational CEO,
i.e., m = 1) for di¤erent caps on variable versus xed compensation on the horizontal axis. The
top panel shows debt while the bottom panel shows CEOs e¤ort on the vertical axis.
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Figure 2. Regulating Leverage. This gure compares the market equilibrium with
an optimistic CEO (m = 0:5) with the socially optimal case (rational CEO, i.e., m = 1) for
di¤erent caps on leverage on the horizontal axis. The top panel shows debt while the bottom
panel shows CEOs e¤ort on the vertical axis.
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Figure 3. Comparing the Regulatory Tools. This gure compares the market equi-
librium under regulatory caps on compensation and leverage that achieve the optimal level of
leverage ( d = dT = d) for di¤erent levels of CEO optimism, m, on the horizontal axis. The top
panel plots the CEOs e¤ort while the bottom panel plots, on the vertical axis, the variable 
controlling the variable payments. The gure includes the socially optimal case (rational CEO,
i.e., m = 1):
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